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NOTES
Correction of Damage Verdicts in Pennsylvania
In a recent Pennsylvania case plaintiff, who had sued for personal injuries and received a verdict of $2,500, moved for a new trial on the ground
that the verdict was inadequate. The court in banc found that the verdict
was inadequate, but refused a new trial if defendant would file a stipulation agreeing to pay the plaintiff $3,750.1

The general question of the pro-

priety of this procedure has been widely discussed.2 However, it may prove
of interest to examine the Pennsylvania cases to determine what action a
trial or appellate court may take after it determines a verdict to be excessive
or inadequate.
I. TRIAL COURT
There are four possible rulings the trial court might make on a motion
for a new trial by the party who is adversely affected by an inadequate or
excessive verdict: (i) dismiss the motion unconditionally; (2) grant a new
trial unconditionally; (3) dismiss the motion if the other litigant will agree
to a specified change in the amount of the verdict; or (4)so change the verdict itself, without the consent of either party, that the objection to its
amount will no longer be valid. Either one of two objections might be
raised to the use of any one of these possible devices. There may be no
authority, common-law or statutory, which would give the court such
power; or the exercise of such a power may infringe the litigant's constitutional right to trial by jury.
May the trial court dismiss the motion unconditionally? It is generally
said that a trial court has wide discretion in granting or refusing a new
trial under these circumstances.3 However, it has never been clearly pointed
out whether this discretion relates to determining whether the verdict is
excessive or inadequate, or to deciding, conceding the verdict to be improper, whether a new trial should be granted. If the discretion applies in
both respects, then it would appear that the trial court may dismiss the
motion without conditions. However, the more plausible interpretation of
the cases is that the trial court has discretion in determining whether the
verdict is excessive or inadequate; after this is determined the aggrieved
party must be given relief.4
i. Svoboda v. Pittsburgh, 34 D. & C. 47 (C. P. Pa. 1938). In a first suit plaintiff
recovered $5oo and was granted a new trial because of the inadequacy. This was the
result of the second trial. There seems to be no limit to the number of new trials that
can be granted. "The question of the amount of the verdict is ordinarily for the court
below, and where a grossly excessive amount is returned the trial court should never
allow it to stand, no matter how many new trials it may be obliged to grant." Rea v.
Pittsburgh and Connellsville R. R., 229 Pa. io6, 114, 78 Atl. 73, 76 (191o). See cases
collected in 6

STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE

(1936) § 23, p. 260.

See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474 (1935), wherein the United States Supreme
Court considers this problem. The Court was divided five to four; a comprehensive
opinion by Justice Sutherland for the majority declared that the use of additur violated
the Federal Constitution's provision for trial by jury. Justice Stone wrote an able dissent for the minority. The Dimick case brought forth over twenty law review articles,
notes and comments. Some of these were: Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 318; (I935) 83
U. OF PA. L. REV. 684; (1934) 48 HARv. L. REv. 333. For a discussion of the different
2.

state rulings on this matter see Note (1935)

3.

13 N. C. L. REV. 514.

AMRAM, PENNSYLVANIA COMMON PLEAS PRACTICE

(4th ed. 1936)

4- See Gail v. Philadelphia, 273 Pa. 275, 278, 117 Atl. 69, 70

(1922)

173.

: "In the proper

administration of the law, the remedy for excessive verdicts is by application to the trial
(980)
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The second possibility is to grant a new trial unconditionally. The
cases are legion wherein the trial court has used this method to correct
both inadequate and excessive verdicts" It cannot be attacked as an impairment of the right to trial by jury, for certainly this was an approved
practice of the trial courts at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Any authorized practice of a trial court at that time is within the limitation
of the constitutional meaning of "trial by jury as heretofore". 6
The third possibility as a method for correcting the verdict would be
to enter a conditional order refusing a new trial if the other litigant will
agree to a definite change in the amount of the verdict. Here it becomes
important to distinguish cases of excessive verdicts from cases where the
verdict is inadequate. In the former the use of the conditional decree of
remittitur in Pennsylvania is well established. 7 However, it would seem to
be important to know whether the court is conditioning its order upon the
return of the amount in excess of the highest possible verdict, the lowest
possible verdict, or some mean amount between these two figures. This
problem has been considered to be very imporant in other jurisdictions,"
but the Pennsylvania cases employ language indicating an indiscriminate
use of these standards.9
A rather interesting variation of the orthodox procedure of remittitur
was prevalent in Pennsylvania about two decades ago. After finding the
verdict was excessive, the trial court would enter a conditional order directing plaintiff to file a stipulation within five days reducing the verdict; then
it would require that within ten days thereafter defendant either pay the
verdict as reduced or suffer judgment to be entered for the excessive amount.
In arriving at this result the court relied on the usual reasoning that, since
it had broad discretion in dealing with excessive verdicts, it could require
both parties to comply with desired conditions before the discretion would be
exercised.Y0 Although this practice seems never to have been held beyond the
power of a trial court, the Supreme Court has strongly disapproved of the
procedure as imposing a penalty on a defendant of limited means.". This
practice would prove beneficial to a plaintiff who was recovering against
court. . . . This power of supervision is not merely a privilege conferred, but an
imperative duty imposed upon it."
5. See cases collected in 6 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRAC'rCE (1936) § 75, P. 314
et seq.

6. For a valuable discussion of the cases which deal with the right to trial by jury

in Pennsylvania with respect to the instant problem, see Smith v. Times Publishing Co.,
Many additional cases are cited in the argument of
178 Pa. 481, 36 Atl. 296 (897).
counsel printed in the official report.
7. AMRAm, PENNSYLVANIA COMMON PLEAS PRACTICE (4th ed. 1936) 174; see
cases collected in 6 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE (1936) § 113, p. 362, n. 9.
8. Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374 (1927). See Note (1939) 5
U. OF PITTS3URGH L. REv. IOI, 103.
9. Thirkell v. Equitable Gas Co., 307 Pa. 377, 161 Atl. 313 (1932) ("These facts
compel a reduction . . . to such a point as . . . would appear just and proper.") ;
Alio v. Pennsylvania R. R., 312 Pa. 453, 167 Atl. 326 (1933) ("We think that $12,500

is the largest sum which can be supported as not excessive.") ; Koontz v. Messer &
Quaker State Oil Refining Co., 320 Pa. 487, 181 Atl. 792 (1936) ("We think $I5,OOO
is the largest amount which can be supported as not excessive.") ; McLaughlin v. Tygard, 324 Pa. 146, 188 Atl. 105 (1936) ("We think the ends of justice will be met if the
verdict is cut down to $3,500.") ; Ward v. Pittsburgh Ry., 2 A. (2d) 694 (Sup. Ct. Pa.

1938) ("We have reached the conclusion that $25,o0o will fully and justly compensate

plaintiff. ...

").

io. See Wirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 8, 7o AtI. 9o6 (19o8).
ii. Ralston v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. (No. 2), 267 Pa. 278, Iio Atl. 336
(1920).
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a defendant who could pay at once, for it would relieve plaintiff of the
trouble of collecting his judgment.
Another interesting variation from the normal procedure of correcting
an excessive verdict was attempted by one lower court. In a suit for damages for the taking of property by eminent domain, the jury returned a
verdict against the city for an excessive amount. The court entered an
order refusing the defendant city a new trial, provided the plaintiff dedicate
part of his remaining land to the city for a park. The Supreme Court, on
plaintiff's appeal, held this to be an abuse of discretion and directed the
12
case to be returned for proper disposition of the motion for a new trial.
Such an order by a trial court savours more of a court of equity than a
court of law. Surely the only proper method of correcting an excessive
verdict with a conditional decree is to make the condition the return of the
excess.
When the jury's verdict is inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for
the damages he has suffered, the practice of trial courts in Pennsylvania
has been to grant a new trial unconditionally. 3 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has squarely held that this is the only proper procedure.' 4 Under
such circumstances the plaintiff is "entitled, as a matter of right, to have
the jury pass fairly on the question of damages, and by their verdict award
him such sum as, under the evidence, he was entitled to." 15 Counsel for
the appellee in the qu6ted case argued the similarity between conditional
orders of remittitur and additur in an effort to have the trial court's action
sustained. Unfortunately the court, though permitting remittitur and denying the use of additur, did not feel called upon to distinguish them.
Since this decision a clear case of orthodox additur has nfot been
taken to the Supreme Court. However, there have been practices appearing quite similar to additur which the court has refused to permit. In one
case the plaintiff had an undisputed claim for certain goods and a disputed
claim for others. The value of both was in dispute. However, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. On a motion for a new trial, the court
entered a conditional order refusing the new trial if the defendant paid
plaintiff a fixed sum, which was less than the alleged value of the goods.
The defendant tendered the amount but the plaintiff refused it, and the
motion for a new trial was dismissed. The Supreme Court in reversing
this action of the trial court said: "Under all rules regulating the practice
of courts, she [plaintiff] was entitled to a new trial, when the jury, either
ignorantly or contumaciously, refused to obey the law as directed by the
court; but where is the authority in precedent or reason for arbitrarily
deducting from what she insists is an honest claim ?" "I Obviously in every
case of additur to which a plaintiff objects, what he believes to be an honest
claim is being reduced.
In a more recent case where the defendant had the verdict, plaintiff
moved for a new trial on the ground that a witne-is had been bribed. The
court entered a conditional order refusing a new trial if defendant paid
into court a stipulated amount for the plaintiff's benefit. Here the problem
was not squarely raised, for defendant refused to comply and a new trial
was ordered. On defendant's appeal, this conditional order was ably presented to the Court as being beyond the power of the trial court. The
6

12. Stauffer v. Reading, 206 Pa. 479, 55 Atl. lO72 (I9O3).
13. Hilkirk v. Hughes, 103 Super. 73, 157 At1. 915 (1931).
STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE (1936)

§ 85, p.

See cases collected in

330.

14. Bradwell v. Railway Co., 139 Pa. 4o4, 2o At1. 1046 (i8gi).
15. Id. at 413, 2o At1. at lO46-47.
i6. Lehr v. Brodbeck, 192 Pa. 535, 541, 43 AtI. ioo6, ioo8 (1899).
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Supreme Court refused to pass on the question, since no harm had been
done, but remarked that such an order "is not free from criticism." 17
The lower court in the current case was not advised of any of the
above cases, for it expressly considered the point involved as one of first
impression in Pennsylvania. s Therefore, until some court finds a method
of distinguishing what appears to be a square holding and refuting the reasoning of the above cases, it would seem that additur is not available as a
means of correcting an inadequate verdict by the trial court.
Finally the trial court might correct either an inadequate or an excessive verdict by unconditionally entering a verdict for an amount it thinks
to be proper. In the case of an excessive verdict there would seem to be
no valid constitutional objection to such a practice for, as will be indicated
later, the appellate courts exercise such a power by statute. However,
quaere whether this will be extended to the case of an inadequate verdict?
But regardless of the constitutional objection, no such statutory authority
has been given to the lower courts. Two lower court opinions are open to
the interpretation that the court entered an unconditional order reducing
the verdict.' 9 However, in both cases there was a motion for a new trial,
and the report of the cases does not indicate what disposition was made of
the motions. Certainly no appellate court authority has been found that
would validate this procedure. Furthermore, it is open to the objection of
both parties, whereas a conditional order can be objected to by only one.
If the other does not agree to the stipulation, the result is simply a new
trial.
APPELLATE COURT

An appellate court will be very cautious in saying that a verdict which
the trial court has sustained is not in accord with the damage suffered. It
is usually said that such action will be taken only when there has been a
palpable abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.20 Still, the appellate court will, if it determines the verdict
to be out of proportion to the
2
damages, take some action to correct it. '
It is not at all clear whether there was authority for the appellate courts
to review the verdict prior to the Act of 1891.22 Certainly cases can be
found where the court did grant new trials, 28 but there are other cases
which denied that the court had any authority to review the verdict of a
jury.24 The majority of the Supreme Court in 1897 did not believe that,
I7. Fulginiti v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 259 Pa. 344, 346, io3 Atl. 5i (I918).

I8. Svoboda v. Pittsburgh, 34 D. & C. 47, 5o (C. P. Pa. 1938).
ig. Stover v. Armour, 77 Pitts. L. J. 556 (C. P. Pa. 1929); Hepplewhite v. Lavenka, So Pitts. L. J. 329 (C. P. Pa. I93O). But see Note (i939) 5 U. OF PITTSBURGH

L. REv. IOI, where the conclusion is drawn from these two cases that the lower court
has power absolutely to reduce the verdicts.
2o. Dunlap v. Pittsburgh, H. B. & N. C. Ry., 247 Pa. 23o, 93 Ad. 276 (i9r5);
Scott v. American Express Co., 257 Pa. 25, 31, ioi At. 96, 98 (917).
2r. Brown v. Paxton, 2 A. (2d) 729 (Sup. Ct. Pa. I938).
22. PA. STAT. Axx. (Purdon, i93i) tit. x2, § 1164. There were two former acts
dealing with the authority to review the errors of the trial courts. I Smith Laws,
§ I3, p. 140 (722) ; Act of June i6, 1836, P. L. 784. For a discussion of these three
acts see Summers v. Kramer, 271 Pa. I89, 114 Atl. 525 (1921).
23. Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 4 Rawle 8 (Pa. I833).
Cf. Thomas v. The Northern Liberties, 13 Pa. 117 (185o).
24. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Allen, 53 Pa. 276 (i866). "It [the verdict] may be and
it probably is the fact that the damages found were excessive and quite unreasonable.
. . . But this is irremediable by us. The only palliation that remains in such a case
(it is not a cure) is the free exercise of the power which the Court of Common Pleas
has to grant new trials." Id. at 28o
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25
without this statutory authority, the appellate court could take any action.
This Act provides that "The Supreme Court shall have power in all cases
to affirm, reverse, amend or modify a judgment, order or decree appealed
from, and to enter such judgment, order or decree in the case as the Supreme Court may deem proper . . .", 26 There can be little doubt that, if
the Supreme Court can constitutionally be given authority to deal with verdicts, this Act would clearly permit the court to grant a new trial, to use a
remittitur to correct an excessive verdict, or to enter an absolute decree
setting the verdict at a smaller figure. Perhaps an argument could be
made that "amend or modify" does not include the power to add to an inadequate verdict. However, when the entire Act is read the tenor would
certainly indicate that the power to add to an inadequate verdict was intended to be given to the court.
The constitutionality of this Act as applied to an excessive verdict has
been considered but once, with a majority and three concurring opinions
agreeing on one point only, that a new trial could be granted.2 7 The majority of the court felt that the statute would only be constitutional if
limited to giving the court authority to grant a new trial.28 One justice felt
that remittitur would also be proper relief. 29 Still another indicated that
the statute did nothing more than restate the common-law authority of the
appellate court to correct errors of the lower courts.30 Finally, one justice
felt the Act was unconstitutional but concurred in result by sustaining another assignment of error.31
For at least twenty years after this case the Supreme Court refused to
exercise its authority under this Act and repeatedly said that it would only
be used when the verdict was grossly in excess of the damages.2 2 The next
case in which the Court declared a verdict to be excessive was in 1922 when
a new trial was granted.3 3 This practice of granting new trials seems to
have continued to be the only power exercised by the Supreme Court till
1932, when it pointed out that there were three expedients that could be
employed-new trial, absolute reduction, and additur. 34 In that case the
Supreme Court ordered a remittitur. This departure from the original
construction of the power the Act contained did not evoke that reconsideration of its constitutionality which would appear necessary in view of the
original opinions upholding the Act. After this case, the Court began to
use all three methods of dealing with a verdict, with clear cases of simply
reducing the verdict which a trial court had sustained 3 5 or remitting more
than the trial court had remitted. 36 Interesting as this transition may be,
there can be little doubt that the appellate courts in Pennsylvania will continue to use these three methods of correcting excessive verdicts.

25. Smith v. Times Publishing Co., 178 Pa. 481, 498, 36 Atl. 296, 297 (1897).
was the first case to arise under the i8pi Act.

This

26. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 1164.

27. Smith v. Times Publishing Co., 178 Pa. 481, 36 Atl. 297 (1897).
28. Id. at 503, 36 At. at 299.
29. Ibid.
30. Id. at 515, 36 Atl. at 307.
31. Id. at 516, 36 AtI. at 299.
32. Dunlap v. Pittsburgh, H. B. & N. C. Ry., 247 Pa. 230, 93 Atl. 276 (1915).
33. Gail v. Philadelphia, 273 Pa. 275, 117 Atl. 69 (1922).
34. Thirkell v. Equitable Gas Co., 307 Pa. 377, 161 At. 313 (1932).

35. Brown v. Paxton, 2 A. (2d) 729 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1938). The court here talks
of reducing the verdict "to the amount for which, in our opinion, it should have been
entered in the court below". Id. at 731. It is submitted that this does not mean that
the lower court itself should have absolutely reduced the verdict.
36. Tauber v. Wilkinsburg, 309 Pa. 331, 163 Atl. 675 (1932).
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But what will happen when the court is confronted for the first time
with an inadequate verdict under this Act? Obviously, this situation must
be distinguished from the Court's former holding that the trial court could
only grant a new trial. If the Court really means what it says when it
refers to its authority to enter such a verdict as justice may require, by the
use of either a conditional or an absolute decree, then it would seem to have
the power to correct an inadequate verdict in the same manner as it might
an excessive one. Any constitutional objection which might be made to the
entering of such a conditional decree would seem to have less force here
than in the case of an absolute reduction, the constitutionality of which the
Court has never questioned.
CONCLUSION

The cases seem to establish that any court in Pennsylvania, once it
has determined that a verdict does not represent the actual damage suffered,
has constitutional authority to grant a new trial unconditionally. If the
verdict is excessive, then any court may enter a conditional order of remittitur. Any appellate court has constitutional authority to enter an absolute decree reducing the verdict in such a case. If the verdict is inadequate,
then the trial court has authority only to grant a new trial. However, the
appellate courts seem to have statutory authority to enter a conditional
order of additur or an absolute order raising the verdict, but have not as
yet passed on its constitutionality.
It is submitted that the reasoning that has been used to justify a conditional order of remittitur is not sound. The theory expressed is that,
since the court has discretion to grant a new trial, it can place proper conditions on the parties before it will exercise its discretion. This must assume
that the court, in its discretion, can refuse to correct an excessive verdict.
Certainly there is no authority for such an assumption. This has probably
resulted from a confusion of a court's wide discretion to determine which
verdicts are excessive or inadequate with a litigant's right to have errors
corrected. However, remittitur can properly be justified on the theory that
it was in use at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and therefore
is not affected by it, a theory which is unavailable to sustain the constitutionality of additur in Pennsylvania.
R. W., Jr.

Funds of Unincorporated Labor Unions-Judicial Control of
Their Acquisition, Possession, and Use
I. INTRODUCTION

The basic problem involved in judicial intervention in the administration of the funds of an unincorporated union is that to allow an absolute
freedom in the collection, control and use of funds is to invite corruption
and the exploitation of members by their leaders; 1 to interfere with the
administration of union funds is to hamper seriously the carrying forward
of labor's cause. 2 Thus courts which are anxious to be fair to organized
labor are placed in a dilemma in attempting a determination of which course
to follow.
i.For example, see Collins v. International Alliance,
(1935).
2. Chafee,

REv. 993, 1027.

iig N. J. Eq. 230,

182 At. 37

The Internal Affairs of Associations not for Profit (1930) 43 HAv. L.
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Whether we describe union funds as trust property, partnership property, the property of co-owners, or the property of a legal entity (quasicorporation) seems to be of small moment in a consideration of the factors
leading to court control of the administration of such funds." The purpose
of this article is not to determine the character of such funds in order to
relegate them to any accepted category; it is rather an attempt to discover
under what circumstances courts will intervene in their administration, and
to determine what course will be followed if there is intervention. For
this purpose, in view of the conflicting concepts as to the nature of such
funds, it seems advisable to treat them as sui generis and to confine the
discussion
4 to the legal consequences of the various transactions which are
involved.
At the outset, it must be noted that there is a dearth of American
cases on many of the problems arising in connection with union funds.
Consequently, recourse must be had to the English law. But there are
very important differences, both legislative and judicial, between American
and English trade union law. The English law has stemmed mainly from
legislative enactments, 5 whereas, in the United States there are few governing statutes available to the courts in order to determine or interpret
the law of labor union funds.6 It should be noted, moreover, that even in
this country, where there has been little legislation regarding the internal
affairs of unions, the constitutions and charters of the various unions tend
to make each case a law unto itself. Generalizations are difficult and
dangerous since few, if any, unions have identical constitutions.
2. COLLECTION OF FUNDS

Of prime importance in a discussion of funds must, of necessity, be
a consideration of their acquisition. The standard method for acquiring
union funds is the process of imposing dues, initiation fees, fines and assessments. As to initiation fees there is virtually no problem. It is settled
law that a union has the right to determine who shall be its members. 7
Payment of initiation fee is made a condition precedent to membership.
Until the fee is handed over in the prescribed manner none of the rights
or privileges of membership is accorded the applicant, and hence there can
be no intra-union dispute as to the power or method of collection of such
funds. As to the collection of dues, fines, assessments and donations various problems arise.
a. Method of Collection
Collection of dues and assessments is usually made by the local union,
with a per capita remittance from local to national.8 Payment to anyone
designated by the local union for that purpose discharges the member's
obligation to both local and national. 9
3. Id. at 996.
4. See Low v. Harris, 9o F. (2d) 783, 784 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
5. The Trade Unions Act, 1871, 34 & 35 VIcT. c. 31, was the first English statute
dealing with the problem of union funds.
6. MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW (1925)

53.

7. Steever, The Control of Labor Through Union Discipline (1931)

Q.

x6 CORN. L.

212, 217.

8. For examples see Green v. Gravatt, ig F. Supp. 87, 90 (W. D. Pa. 1937) ; cf.
Local 373 International Ass'n of Bridge & Ironworkers v. International, 12o N. J. Eq.
220, 184 Atl. 531 (1936) ; Kelso v. Cavanagh, 137 Misc. 653, 244 N. Y. Supp. go (Sup.
Ct. 1930).

9. Weiss v. Tenant, 2 Misc. 213, 21 N. Y. Supp. 252 (Sup. Ct. 1892) ; Brown v.
Supreme Court I. 0. F., 172 N. Y. 132, 68 N. E. 145 (1903).
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The problem of what constitutes a discharge of the obligation to pay
dues, assessments and fines presents more difficulty where the "check-off"
method is employed. Under the usual check-off arrangement the employer
agrees to deduct dues and assessments from the wages of union member
This
employees and agrees to pay them over directly to the union.'
system has been condemned by employers and union leaders alike. The
employers claim that a check-off contract tends to force employee unionization; 11 labor sympathizers contend that the check-off gives the employer
the means of keeping employees in a company union, of obtaining knowledge of the financial strength of the union in order to be able to bargain
with it more effectively, and of learning what employees have union affiliations in order to practice discrimination. 12 Congress has recognized the
validity of the latter contentions by expressly outlawing the check-off
under the 1934 Railway Labor Act.13 Also, under the National Labor
Relations Act 14 the check-off has been held to constitute an unfair labor
practice if used in connection with an attempt to foster a company union.15
Provisions almost identical with those of the national act are included in
the five state labor relations acts. 16 Except under these legislative enactments, careful search has revealed no cases of judicial interference with
the check-off.17 Where a union member has agreed to a check-off payment, the agreement has been enforced against the member1 ' and the
union has been forced to treat the employer as its agent for collection. 9
valid objections to the check-off, courts will not interfere to preDespite2 the
0
vent it.
Gifts constitute a portion of union revenue. They are sometimes
unsolicited, but are more often the result of some appeal for the aid of
io. For typical examples of such a check-off contract see Association of Rock I.
Employees v. Lowden, 15 F. Supp. 176, 178 (D. Kan. 1936) ; the United Mine Workers and Anthracite Operators contract, i L. R. REP. 587 (1938); the United Mine
Workers and Harlan County Coal Operators contract, 3 L. R. REP. 12 (1938). For a
discussion of the various types of check-off see 2 L. R. REP. 336 (1938).
ii. Resolution of the Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers, i L. R. REP. 383 (1937).
12. The Progressive Miners of America (A. F. of L.) offer as a selling point in
their membership campaign against the United Mine Workers (C. I. 0.) the fact that
the A. F. of L. contracts do not include a check-off provision. 2 L. R. REP. 267 (1938).
13. 48 STAT. 1187 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. § 152 (4) (Supp. 1938). The constitutionality of the enactment was upheld, even where it operated to render ineffective a preexisting check-off contract. The court recognized the validity of the argument that the
check-off tends to interfere with labor's right to uninfluenced choice of representatives.
General Lodge No. 3 v. Lowden, 86 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. loth, 1936), aff'g I5 F.
Supp. 176 (D. Kan. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 659 (1937), io8 A. L. R. 1133 (937).
14. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (2) (Supp. 1938).
15. In the Matter of Heller Bros., 7 N. L. R. B. 646 (1938). To the same effect
see In the Matter of Idaho Maryland Mines Corp., 4 N. L. R. B. 784 (1938) ; In the
Matter of Loan Star Bag and Bagging Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 244 (1938).
16. Mass. Acts 1937, c. 592; N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS (Cahill Supp. 1937) c. 32, § 704;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1938) tit. 43, § 211.6; Utah Laws 1937, c. 55; Wis.
Laws 1937, c. 51.

17. Cf. Sanders v. Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 196 S. E. 543 (S. C.
1938).

18. Harper v. Charente Steamship Co., 73 Sor. J. 2
ig. O'Connell v. O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 3 N. Y. S.

(1928).
(2d) 833 (Sup. Ct. 1938).

2o. However, where a trade union attempted a reversal of the customary practice by

receiving from a member who was an insurance agent the premiums he had collected,
deducting from the commission due the agent the amount of his dues, forwarding the
balance of the commission to the agent-member, and the remainder to the insurance
company, the practice was enjoined. Royal London Mut. Ins. Soc. v. Williamson, 37 T.
L. R. 742 (Ch. 192I).
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strikers, a depleted treasury, or the like. The capacity of unions to take
title to land under a will has been seriously questioned 21 and so such
property is usually given by means of a trust deed for the benefit of the
union.2 2 However, there seems to be no objection to a union's receipt of
funds and personalty under a will.2 3 More important is the method of
collecting contributions from living members. The courts will scrutinize
such transactions closely, particularly in England where contributions
24 for
political purposes must be voluntarily agreed to under the 1927 Act.
b. Enforcement of Payment

By far the most common and effective sanction for compelling payment of dues and assessments is expulsion for delinquency. Such expulsion is usually provided for in the constitution or charter of the local
(collecting) union. The courts, in harmony with the general policy of
non-interference in the internal affairs of unions, are loath to restrain this
sensible means for enforcing payment. However, it is clear that if nonpayment of dues is used merely as a guise to conceal some other cause of
expulsion,25 if the expulsion has not been effected in conformity with the
formal requirements of the constitution and charter,26 or if the dues or
assessments were unwarranted 27 an action may be brought by the member
to compel reinstatement or to obtain damages for wrongful expulsion.
Hence the effectiveness
2 s of the sanction is hampered by the possibility of a
court's negativing it.
Where a local union fails to make remittances to the parent, the customary sanction usually provided for in the constitution or charter is the
revocation of the local's charter. 29 However, such revocation may be
declared ineffective in respect to members of the local who have paid all
dues and assessments to the local, since, in most cases, the local is a designated agent of the parent body for the receipt of dues.30
Another method of enforcing payment of dues is the use of dues
payment stamps, without which a member cannot obtain employment under
a union contract. Payment of dues is a condition precedent to receipt of
21. Shein v. Erasmus Realty Co., 194 App. Div. 38, 184 N. Y. Supp. 840 (2d Dep't,

1920) ; It re Amos, Carrier v. Price, [1891] 3 Ch. 159; see WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCORPoRATED ASSoCIATIoNS AND BusiNEsss TRuSTS (2d ed. 1923) 336.
22. Id. at 377. The Trade Unions Act of 1871, 34 & 35 Vxcr. c. 31, § 7 makes provision for the holding of real property by means of trustees.
23. See WRIGHTINGTON, Op. Cit stPranote 21, at 352.

24. Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927, 17 & 18 GEo. V, C. 22, § 4. In
Wilson v. Amalgamated Soc. of Engineers, [i9II] 2 Ch. 324, a supposedly voluntary

contribution was considered compulsory by the court, since union members were charged
with the levy unless they objected. Hence such collection was enjoined. However, no
injunction would have been issued had the contributions been voluntary, hence the
method of collection was the determining factor.
In Fuerst v. Musical Mutual Prot. Union, 95 N. Y. Supp. 155 (N. Y. City Ct.
29o5) the fact that plaintiff was coerced into payment of a fine was an important factor
in the determination that the fine was illegal and plaintiff was entitled to damages.
25. Fleming v. Moving Picture Operators, i A. (2d) 386 (N. J. Ch. 1938).
26. Blackall v. National Union of Foundry Workers, 39 T. L. R. 431 (K. B. 2923).
27. Sweetman v. Barrows, 263 Mass. 349, 161 N. E. 272 (1928).
28. But see Malloy v. Carrol, 287 Mass. 376, 194 N. E. 661 (1934), for a possible
solution of this difficulty.
29. See Centralia Labor Temple Ass'n v. O'Day, I9 Wash. 331, 246 Pac. 930

(2926), for a case involving the consequences of a revocation of a local charter because
of the local's failure to pay dues.
3o. Brown v. Supreme Court I. 0. F., 172 N. Y. 132, 68 N. E. 145 (1903).

NOTES

the stamps, which are placed on the member's union
card. There is but
31
one reported interference with this effective device.
c. Limitations on the Power to Collect Dues

The basic principle which limits both collections and expenditures is
that they must effect the purposes of the union as stated in the constitution, charter, and by-laws. 32 Intervention is justified, usually, on the
theory that the constitution, charter and by-laws are part of a contract
between the members and the union3 3 (as well as a contract between the
members inter sesse), and hence collection for a purpose not provided for
constitutes a contract breach. Another rationalization used to justify interference is that the union is similar to a corporation, with constitution,
charter and by-laws similar to the articles of incorporation and by-laws of
a corporation, 34 and hence the collection is ultra vires.
In England, as a result of a long chain of decisions and statutes, 35 no
collection for political purposes may be made unless a union member has
affirmatively signified his desire to be levied on for the support of labor's
political movement. 38 Thus the political activities of labor unions have
been curtailed. The English law as to political collections and expenditures has generally been treated as of only academic interest in the United
States. However, with the recent growth of political activity among
American unions, the issue of political expenditures has become very much
alive. No cases could be found where collection for political purposes by
an American union has been enjoined, which may indicate judicial recognition of the fact that the problem is for the legislature, not the courts. The
recently enacted Oregon Anti-Picketing Statute3 7 includes provisions
which would seem to be an attempt to circumscribe a union's power to
collect funds for political purposes. The union is restricted to collections
for the "legitimate requirements . . . in carrying out" its "lawful purposes or activities". 3
One further limitation upon the collection power has been recognized.
If the collection is for an illegal purpose it may be enjoined. An injunction has even been obtained by an employer against collection of, and
against threats to collect, fines where such fines are being collected in order
to force union members to break an employment contract.39 The Oregon
enactment, in its stipulation that collections shall not "create a fund in
excess of legitimate requirements . . . in carrying out [the union's]
lawful purposes" 40 may foster exceedingly rigid restriction. The enactment fairly invites judicial legislation through the medium of "interpretaMullins v. Merchandise Drivers Local Union, i2o N. J.Eq. 307, 185 Atl. 51
(expelled local union secretary compelled by court to sign order to national
for stamps).
32. "The proposed levies may be irregular in the sense that the manner in which
they are to be made is not expressly provided for, but, being for purposes authorized by
the rules, they are not in any way illegal." Steele v. South Wales' Miners' Federation, [I9O7] i K. B. 361, 368.
33. For an excellent criticism of the contract theory, although admitting its adoption in America and England, see Chafee, supra note 2, at 1ooI.
34. GREENwooD, THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE UNIONS (i9II) 15.
35. See Rothschild, Government Regulation of Trade Unions in Great Britain
(1938) 38 COL. L. REv. I, 1335, for a comprehensive study of English legislation as to
31.

(1937)

trade unions, including a discussion of political contributions, id. at 1356-i36o, 1379-1380.
36. Trade Dispute and Trade Unions Act of 1927, 17 & IS Guo. V, § 4.
37. 3 L. R. REP. 331 (1938).

38. Id. at 332, § 4.
39. Wilcutt v. Driscoll,
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Mass. 110, 85 N. E. 897 (39o8).

40. § 4, 3 L. R. REP. 332 (1938).
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tion". In the light of the conflicting English interpretations of the much

more definite Trade Unions Act, 1871,4" the way is open for the Oregon
courts to adopt a very liberal attitude as to the legality of collections of
union funds, or a very narrow one, dependent on their concept of the
"lawful purposes" of a union. The enactment is chiefly important as
being indicative of42 the increased public interest in regulation of the internal
affairs of unions.

3. INTRA-UNION CONFLICT OVER THE RIGHT TO FUNDS
In view of the complicated structure of the modem labor union and

the sizeable amounts of funds handled by them, 43 conflicts as to the right
to funds are almost inevitable. It is particularly in this field that generalizations are dangerous because of the differences in constitutions and
structures of the various unions.
a. Parent-Local Disputes
A common provision in the charter of a local union is that all funds,
books and property shall be turned over to the parent body upon dissolution, revocation of the charter, or suspension of the local. The decisions
of the courts on such forfeiture clauses are not uniform, but the clause has
been enforced when the local voluntarily dissolves. 44
Where there has been no affiliation with a parent body and a local
union is dissolved, either voluntarily or by a court, a controversy intimately
connected with the nature of the funds arises. Courts have gone so far
as to appoint a receiver to dispose of the funds. 45 Apparently, although
there are few adjudications on this point, the only practical method for
distribution of the funds is to divide them among the members in good
a share proportionate to his contributions
standing, each member receiving
46
to the funds of the union.
Much more frequent and pressing today is the situation where the
charter of the local union has been revoked by the national body, in which
case courts are hesitant to enforce a forfeiture clause. The general policy
of construing forfeitures strictly is invoked, and if all the formal requirements for revocation have not been carried out in compliance with the
47
union's constitution and charter, the forfeiture will not be enforced.
41. In Steele v. South Wales' Miners' Fed., [1907] 1 K. B. 361, collection for
political purposes was permissible because the court felt that the lawful purposes outlined in the Trade Unions Act of 1871 were not intended to exclude other purposes
from legality. In Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Engineers v. Osborne, [191o] A. C. 87,
the House of Lords felt that the legislation was intended to limit lawful purposes to
those declared in the act.
42. In this connection, it should be noted that the enactment was passed by the
electorate (not the legislature) in the 1938 elections. 3 L. R. REP. 331 (1938).
43. The financial reports of the United Mine Workers, i L. R. REP. 587 (1938),
and of the International Ladies Garment Workers, I L. R. REP.479 (1938), give some
idea of the large sums involved.
44. Knights of Pythias v. Germania Lodge, 56 N. J. Eq. 63, 38 AtI. 341 (Ch. 1897)
(members of local fraternal society liable to parent body for amount of funds distributed upon dissolution) ; Cope v. Crossingham, [19o9] 2 Ch. 149 (injunction granted
central union against distribution of funds by local on dissolution).
45. Kealey v. Faulkner, i8o Ohio Dec. 498 (C. P. 1907).
46. Inre Printers and Transferrers Amalg. Trade Prot. Soc., [1899] 2 Ch. 184.
47. Green v. Gravatt, ig F. Supp. 87 (W. D. Pa. 1937) (suspension of local not
effected by proper authorities); Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal. App. 126, 269 Pac. 455
(1928) (forfeiture not enforced where no hearing given local) ; Grand Lodge v. Reba,
97 Conn. 235, 116 Atl. 235 (1922) (provision for forfeiture when local "lapses" doesn't
include situation where charter revoked) ; Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128
N. E. 704 (1920) (forfeiture enjoined where no fair hearing given) ; Barbrick v. Hud-
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Where there is no constitutional provision for notice to and hearing of the
local, many courts have declared the clause void as against public policy.4"
Others, accepting the constitution and charter as part of a contract between
members,
local, and national, have enforced the forfeiture according to its
49
terms .

As to funds obtained under benefit payment plans, if the benefit funds
have been segregated and have been administered by the local, the courts
will usually not allow revocation to work a forfeiture of them. This is
consistent with the theory that such funds constitute a true trust for the
benefit of the individual members, rather than for the benefit of the union.50
In the absence of a forfeiture clause the courts are very strict in the
requirement of notice and hearing prior to revocation of the charter.51 If
such requisites have been fulfilled the courts must have recourse to the
purposes for which the funds were contributed 5 2 and to the degree of
autonomy of the local union.5 3 It is submitted that the courts are rightly
hesitant about enforcing forfeitures which allow the parent body to obtain
funds by virtue of its own act of revocation. Unless this policy is followed
the temptation to autocratic action will be great.
A frequent controversy, particularly important at a time when two
rival labor groups are struggling for the allegiance of local unions, is the
conflict between the parent and the local union which has changed its
affiliation from one union to another. In this situation there is no voluntary dissolution of the local union, so that a forfeiture clause providing
only for the eventuality of dissolution will not be enforced. Although there
is voluntary surrender of the charter of the local union, and although provision for forfeiture in case of changed allegiance is made, the local union
which unanimously changes
its affiliation has been allowed to continue to
54
hold and use the funds.

b. Disputes Between Factions Within Local
Much more usual than the case where a local union unanimously
agrees to secede from one national union and join another is the situation
where a majority faction within a local seeks to join a different national
union while a minority remains loyal to its national affiliate. In this situation, whether there is a forfeiture clause or not, the courts generally hold
dell, 245 Mass. 428, 139 N. E. 629 (1923) (forfeiture enjoined where revocation was
without proper authority).
48. Swaine v. Miller, 72 Mo. App. 446 (1897).
49. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Williams, 211 Ky. 638, 277 S. W. 500
(1925); Local Union No. 76 of United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United Brotherhood, 143 La. 9O1, 79 So. 532 (1918) ; Shersen v. Lewis, 30 Luzerne Si (Pa. C. P.
1935) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers, i2o N. J. Eq. 346, 184 AtI. 832 (1936).
5o. Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal. App. 126, 269 Pac. 455 (1928) ; State Council v.
Emery, 219 Pa. 461, 68 Atl. 1O23 (19o8).
51.Barbrik v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 139 N. E. 629 (1923); Shadley v. Grand
Lodge, 212 Mo. App. 653, 254 S. W. 363 (1923); Cox v. United Brotherhood, 19o
Wash. 511, 69 P. (2d) 148 (937).
52. See cases cited supra note 49. Since even in the case where there is a forfeiture
clause funds may be exempted from such clause by virtue of the purpose for which they
were donated, the force of such a factor is much stronger where there is no forfeiture
clause.
53. Moyer v. Butte Miners Union, 232 Fed. 788 (D. Mont 1916); Shipwrights,
Joiners, & Calkers Ass'n v. Mitchell, 6o Wash. 529, II Pac. 780 (91o); Cope v.
Crossingham, [I9o9] 2 Ch. 148; (1938) 47 YALa L. J. 483.
54. Donovan v. Danielson, 271 Mass. 267, 171 N. E. 823 (193o).
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that the minority is entitled to the funds,5 5 or that neither the majority
nor the minority can obtain all the funds.56 The minority continues under
the same charter and its existence as a voluntary association has not been
terminated. For this purpose the local union is really treated as an entity
distinct from its members, so that it is unaffected by the loss of a majority
of its supporters. Such a result is consistent with a desire to prevent
domination of members by leaders. In most cases of changed affiliation
the change is brought about by a union officer who is able to carry a
majority of the union along with him. The courts will prevent his depriving the minority of their interest in the union funds.
4. USE OF FUNDS

It is concerning the use of funds that most
union members and union officials arise. Also, the
may be affected by certain uses of union funds, and
courts to protect third parties, as well as members,

controversies between
rights of third parties
so intervention by the
is not infrequent.

a. Illegal Purposes
One of the most common sources of friction between unions and third
parties arises in connection with the use of union funds for strike benefits.
The right of a union to grant strike benefits where a strike is being carried
on by legal methods is not seriously questioned today. 57 However, where
a strike is being carried on by illegal methods or where it is being carried
on to obtain an illegal object, such as breach of contract, injunctions
against the support of the strike through the medium of strike pay 58 or
damages 59 have been awarded to the employer. Once it has been decided
that the strike is illegal it is certainly not surprising that the courts should
interfere to prevent expenditure of union funds to foster such illegality.
However, the determination of the legality or illegality of a strike is a
difficult task, and courts should recognize the dangers of abusing their
discretion, since prevention of strikes by stopping of strike benefits cripples
the union's most effective bargaining weapon.
In England another possible ground for interference is suggested.6
This is the injunctive restraint against the use of funds in order to circumscribe the discretion of a legislative representative. This possibility was
considered by only two of the Lords in the Osborne case, 61 because the
pleadings did not squarely present the issue to the court. However, it
would seem that any such use of funds would be contrary to public policy,
and hence enjoinable at suit of a union member.
55. Low v. Harris, 90 F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), 47 YALE L. J. 483 (1938);
Martin v. Smith, 286 Mass. 227, 19o N. E. 113 (1934); Brownfield v. Simon, 94 Misc.
720, 158 N. Y. Supp. 187 (Sup. Ct. I916), aff'd, 174 App. Div. 872, 159 N. Y. Supp.
11o2 (1916); McDevitt v. Phillips, 45 Dauphin Co. 394 (C. P. Pa. 1938). Contra:

Schweitzer v. Schneider, 86 N. J. Eq. 88, 97 Atl. 159 (Ch. i916); Centralia Labor
Temple Ass'n v. O'Day, 139 Wash. 331, 246 Pac. 93o (1926).

56. Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal. App. 126, 269 Pac. 455 (1928) ; O'Neill v. Delaney,

I58 N. Y. Supp. 665 (Sup. Ct 199o).
57. Barnes v. Berry, 157 Fed. 883 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 19o8), aff'd, 169 Fed. 225 (C.
C. A. 6th, 19o9); MARTIN, THE MoDERx LAW OF LABOR UNIONS (1910) 96; Note
(1927) 47 A. L. R. 282.

58. Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457 (19o8) ; Jones v. Maher, 62

Misc. 388, 116 N. Y. Supp. i8o (Sup. Ct. I9O9), aff'd, 141 App. Div. 919, 125 N. Y.
Supp. 1126 (igio).
59. Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1911) ; Smithies v. Nat'l Ass'n
Operative Plasterers, [igog] I K. B. 310.

6o. Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants v. Osborne, [191o] A. C. 87.
61. Lords Hereford and Dunfermline, id. at 98, io6. For cases indicating a sim-

ilar attitude see Schneider v. Local Union, 116 La. 27o, 40 So. 700 (i9o5) ; Spayd v.
Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1921); (1922) 6 MINN. L. REy. 241;
(1921) 14 A. L. R. 1446; see also Note (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 332.
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A further use of funds which is, of course, illegal is the use by an
officer for personal purposes. Indictment for embezzlement of union funds
at one time encountered the technical difficulty of the necessity for an
allegation of ownership of the funds, and the dogma that a joint owner of
property is incapable of embezzling the same under the usual embezzlement
statute. 62 Since there is no uniformly accepted theory of the ownership of
union funds, statutory enactments have been necessary in many jurisdictions to prevent embezzlement. The Trade Union Act in 1871 was enacted
in England mainly to afford protection of union funds. By legalizing
unions and making it a crime to "wilfully withhold" property of a registered trade union, officers became indictable for the offense.6 3 In America
various embezzlement
statutes have been enacted which specifically include
64
trade union funds.
A further attempt to check dishonesty of union officials is evidenced
in England by requiring that the books and accounts of the union shall be
available to any member or his agent,6 5 and by requiring publication of
annual financial reports."
In the United States there has been little
tendency to require such publication. However, recent agitation has helped
foster the practice of publication of annual financial reportsY1 No American legislation until the Oregon Anti-Picketing Act6 s required that union
books and accounts should be made available to members, but most union
constitutions have some such provision.6 9 It seems that legislation requiring publication of financial statements and auditing of books is desirable. With the large amounts of money handled by unions there should
be some attempt to protect the members from possible dishonesty of officials. Without publication and accounting such dishonesty may long go
unchecked. Although there is force in the argument of labor leaders that
publicity of union financial matters will tend to defeat the purposes of the
labor movement 70 by exposing to the employer with whom the union
seeks to bargain latent weaknesses in the union structure, the necessity for
protecting the individual laborer from exploitation seems to demand publicity in order
to make knowledge of the union's financial status available
71
to members.
62. See Starr v. Chase, 4 D. L. R. 55, 62 (1924).
63. 34 & 35 VICr. c. 31, § 12 (1871). See Knight v. Whitmore, 53 L. T. (N. s.)
233 (Q. B. 1885), for an example of such proceedings.
64. For typical statutes see PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 43, § 197; 4 Mo.
STAT. ANN. (1932) c. 3o, § 4o86.

65. Trade Unions Act of 1871, 34 & 35 VIMC.c. 31, Sched. 1 (6) ; Norey v. Keep,
[igog] i Ch. 56I; Dodd v. Amalg. Marine Workers, [1923] 2 Ch. 236.

66. 34 & 35 ViCr. c. 31, § 16 (1871).
67. See i L. R. REP. 479 (938).
68. The Oregon Act provides that ".r.snaAny
members of any labor organization or association shall be entitled at all reasonable times to inspect the books, records
and accounts of such association, or organization, or any agent or representative thereof,
and to have an accounting of all the money and property thereof." § 4, 3 L. R. REP.
332 (1938).
69. A provision for inspection of books and accounts by trustees was at issue in
Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc. 6o9, 48 N. Y. Supp. 577 (Sup. Ct. 1897).
It is not uncommon for provision to be made for the bonding of local treasurers
or secretaries. Local Lodge No. 104 of Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. International,
158 Wash. 480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930) (national, surety for local officer who absconded,
must reimburse local) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Brotherhood of Painters, etc.,
1:2o N. J. Eq. 307, 184 Atl. 832 (Ch. 1936) (International collects from surety of local
officer who absconded, because local's charter later revoked).
70. See i L. R. REP. 479 (1938).
71. See Boyd, The Case for Regulation of Labor Unions in the United States
(1937) 24 VA. L. Ray. 103.
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Once dishonesty is established the courts may intervene by appointment of a receiver pendente lite 72 or by providing for election of temporary
union officers.7 3 However, courts are reluctant to involve their officers in
the administration of trade unions, hence they hesitate to appoint receivers.
A device not subject to the latter objection is the requirement of an accounting from dishonest union officials at the request of a member. 74
b. "Ultra Vires" Expenditures
Apparently adopting the theory that a union charter and constitution
are the equivalent of articles of incorporation, courts have frequently intervened, upon petition of a member or of a parent union, to enjoin expenditures beyond the purposes outlined in the union's constitution and bylaws.7 5 Such intervention follows the same principles as intervention to
prevent collection for "ultra vires" purpose indicated above.7 6 Since the
expenditure is usually described as ultra vires, rather than as a breach of
contract, it would seem that for this purpose intervention is based on the
theory that union funds are the same as corporation property.
The English courts have also intervened, at the instance of a member,
to enjoin political expenditures, whether within the purpose of the charter
and constitution or not, under the same circumstances
as their intervention
77
to prevent collections for political purposes.
c. Benefit Payments
The English situation with regard to benefit payments out of union
funds is peculiar, due to the phraseology of the Trade Unions Act of 1871.
Although agreements to pay benefits are declared to be legal, the courts
are precluded from directly enforcing them.78 The controversy over the
meaning of the words "direct enforcement" has been an interesting one,
but is of little practical assistance in attempting to discover the American
law as to the use of union funds for benefit payments. Only two cases
could be found wherein an attempt was made to enforce an agreement to
pay a benefit to a union member. In one the member was denied any
remedy, on the tenuous ground that there was provision in the union constitution that no recourse could be had to any tribunals other than those of
72. Chalgian v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 114 N. J. Eq. 497, 169
Atl. 327 (Ch. 1933) ; Ironworkers v. McKee, 114 N. J. Eq. 555, i69 Ati. 351 (Ch.
1933); see Kaplan v. Elliot, 145 Misc. 863, 87o, 261 N. Y. Supp. 112, 119 (Sup. Ct.
1932). For conflicting opinions as to the advisability of appointment of receivers in the
Kaplan case see Notes (1933) 7 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 316, 42 YALE L. J. iz44.
73. Kaplan v. Elliot, 145 Misc. 863, 261 N. Y. Supp. 112 (Sup Ct. 1932).
74. Collins v. International Alliance, ii N. .. Eq. 230, 182 Atl. 37 (Ch. 1935).
75. Flaherty v. Portland Longshoreman's Benev. Soc., 99 Me. 253, 59 Atl. 58
(19o4) (employment of physician not provided for in constitution); Wolfe v. Matthews, 21 Ch. D. 194 (1882) (injunction against expenditure for amalgamation) ; In re
Durham Miners' Ass'n, 17 T. L. R. 39 (C. A. 19oo) (payment of strike benefit ultra
vires because strike unauthorized) ; Alfin v. Hewlett, i8 T. L. R. 664 (Ch. 19o2) (expenditure for legal defense of secretary ultra vires) ; Yorkshire Miners Ass'n v. Howden, [19o5] A. C. 256 (payment of strike benefit contrary to rules of union enjoined) ;
Oram v. Hutt, [1913] I Ch. 259 (payment of legal costs of officer in libel action
enjoined); Bennett v. National Amalg. Soc. of House Painters, 85 L. J. Ch. 298 (1915)
(injunction against investing in newspaper); National Sailors and Firemen v. Reed,
[1926] 1 Ch. 536 (central union obtains injunction against unauthorized expenditure by
local).
76. See supra p. 989.
77. Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants v. Osborne, [1gio] A. C. 87; Wilson v.
Amalg. Soc. of Engineers, [1911] 2 Ch. D. 324; Wilson v. Scottish Typographical
Ass'n, [1912] Sess. Cas. 534; Parr v. Lancashire & Cheshire Miners Fed., [1913] r Ch.
366. See supra p. g8g.
78. 34 & 35 VIcT. c. 31, § 4 (1871).
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the union.79 In the other, a recent Virginia case, an oral agreement to pay
plaintiff a salary in the event of her discharge due to joining the union was
enforced. 0
A type of action which has been allowed in England as not constituting
a direct enforcement of a benefit agreement, and which somewhat defies
classification, is a suit by a member to enjoin the expenditure of funds for
a purpose other than that for which they were donated to the union. Such
a suit was allowed where a union was distributing, as strike benefit under
a benefit agreement, funds which were raised by a sale of tickets for a
special strike aid fund. The court intervened to enjoin the use of these
funds to discharge the union's obligation to pay strike benefits.,, Money
donated under such circumstances appears to conform with the conventional idea of a trust, there being a clear intention to make the union
member the equitable owner of the fund. Although no similar cases could
be found in America it seems clear that where funds are acquired under
such circumstances they may be applied only for the specific purposes for
which they were donated.
5- CONCLUSION

It is evident that there are many circumstances under which courts
will intervene in the financial affairs of unions, despite the avowed policy
of non-intervention. Such a course is often necessary in order to protect
the interests of the individual laborer. Yet the policy of interference must
not be carried too far, lest the entire value of the labor union as a bargaining weapon be destroyed.
The comparatively small amount of reported cases on the problem
makes it inadvisable to attempt any broad generalizations as to when the
courts will intervene. However, it is submitted that the courts have, as a
rule, followed the best course. Intervention has not been on the basis of
any well-defined precedents, but on the basis of the necessities of the
individual cases. Thus the more flagrant abuses have been held in check
without jeopardizing the freedom of action of the unions.
H. F. DeL.

The Law of Fixtures as Between Landlord and Tenant in
Pennsylvania

To the law of fixtures is generally attributed the dubious distinction
of being most elementary in principle, yet most widely confused in practice.1 Its scope has been aptly defined as including "controversies over
rights in chattels which have become so closely associated in use with land
or some improvement thereon that a question arises whether for the purpose of adjusting the rights of the parties, they should not be treated as a
part of the land".2 Clearly enough, such controversies may arise under
a variety of circumstances, and the courts, in deciding them, have developed
79. Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, io8 So. 456 (1926).
So. Kiser v. Amalg. Clothing Workers, 169 Va. 574, 194 S. E. 727 (1938).
Sr. Sanson v. London & Provincial Union, 36 T. L. R. 666 (K. B. 192o).
i. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the Law of Fixtures (19o7) 7 Col. L.
REv. i; Cantwell, Is the Law of Fixtures Irreconcilable? (i899) 48 CENT. L. J. 132;
Niles, The Intention Test in the Law of Fixtures (I934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 66.
2. Bingham, supra note I, at 2. Considerable material on the law of fixtures as
between landlord and tenant may be found in Amos & FERARD, FIXTuREs (3d ed. 1883)
c. 2; BRoNsoN, FIxTUREs (1904) c. 6; EWELL, FIxTUREs (2d ed. 1905) c. 4; 2 TAYLOR,
LANDLORD AND TENANT (gth ed. 19o4) c. 12, § 4; 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT

(191o) c. 23 •
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concepts of policy and presumptions which vary with the relationship existing between the litigants, so that the rights which the term "fixture"
connotes as between landlord and tenant differ from those which attach to
the relation of vendor and vendee, mortgagor and mortgagee, or heir and
executor.3 The object of this Note is to determine the extent to which the
courts in Pennsylvania have developed and maintained an intelligible,
rational approach to that particular phase of the law of fixtures which
concerns the respective rights of landlord and tenant.
REMOVABLE AND IRREMOVABLE FIXTURES

As employed by the courts of Pennsylvania, the term "fixture" describes an article which by reason of its association with land or some
permanent improvement thereon is regarded, for some purposes at least,
as a part of the land. 4 Between landlord and tenant the controversy almost
invariably involves the tenant's privilege to remove articles placed by him
upon the premises. Manifestly, if the article retains all its apparent characteristics as a chattel, with no indication of any such association with the
premises as might cause the casual observer to question its status as real
or personal property, the tenant may remove it. But when so connected
or associated with the premises as to appear to be a part thereof, the question of its removal is not so easily determined.
In general, the early Pennsylvania courts observed the English common-law rule; namely, that "whatever is annexed to the inheritance during
the tenancy becomes so much a part of it, that it cannot be removed by the
tenant, although the improvements may have been made at his own expense." But the rule was only accepted subject to "certain exceptions,
nearly as old as the rule itself, as between landlord and tenant, [namely]
that whatever buildings or other fixtures are erected for the purpose of
carrying on trade or manufactures, may be removed by the tenant during
the term." ' Similar exceptions were later declared to exist for domestic
and agricultural improvements." A review of the Pennsylvania cases
makes it clear that once an article is described as "annexed" it is to be
considered a permanent accession to the freehold 7-- a fixture, but not removable; and those fixtures erected by the tenant which are removable
are not considered "annexed". Hence the issue as between landlord and
tenant is not whether the article is a "fixture" or not-for it may well be
a "fixture" yet not removable." It is, rather, whether the article is "annexed" or not-if the latter it may be removed, if the former it may not.
3. See White v. Arndt, i Whart. 91, 95 (Pa. 1836). But see Bingham, supra note
i, at 8, who suggests that the variations in the law are due to the difference in the questions at issue, rather than to any artificial preferences based on the relations of the
parties. This is also the view taken by Niles, supra note i.
4. There is no uniformity in the terminology of the courts, and some use "fixture"
as meaning an article that may or may not be removable, as in Union Bldg. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Pennell, 78 F. (2d) 959, 963 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) ; others as meaning only
those improvements which are inseparable parts of the realty, for which see Titus v.
Poland Coal Co., 275 Pa. 431, 436, 119 Atl. 540, 542 (923) ; Rogers v. Gillinger, 30 Pa.
185, 189 (1858).
5. White v. Arndt, i Whart. 91, 93 (Pa. 1836) ; see Overton v. Williston, 31 Pa.
155, 158 (1858) ; Davis v. Moss, 38 Pa. 346, 353 (1861) ; Robinson v. Harrison, 237 Pa.
613, 614, 85 Atl. 879, 88o (1912).
6. See In re Shelar, 21 F. (2d) 136, 138 (W. D. Pa. 1927).

A more detailed con-

sideration of these "exceptions" is presented later in this Note, infra at IOOO.
7. See Lemar v. Miles, 4 Watts 330, 332 (Pa. 1835) ; Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. 271,
273 (1866) ; Wick v. Bredin, 189 Pa. 83, 92, 42 Atl. 17, 18 (1899) ; McClintock & Irvine
Co. v. Aetna Explosive Co., 26o Pa. 191, 196, lO3 At. 622, 623 (1918).

8. See Union Bldg. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Pennell, 78 F. (2d) 959, 965 (C. C. A.

3d, 1935) ; Straight v. Mahoney, 16 Pa. Super. 155, 158 (190).
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Accord among the cases and texts is evident only in the recognition
of a variety of factors as affecting removability of a fixture; suggestions
as to the basic element are legion. In Pennsylvania the issue is posed and
resolved in terms of "annexation". Succinctly stated, the "established
rule" is that "as to all articles not so intimately connected with the freehold as to become essentially a part of it, the intention, not the mere physical
fact of their connection with the realty, is the criterion of annexation. But
. . . the 'intention' which thus becomes controlling is not the secret design
which may dwell in a party's mind, and as to whose existence he alone
can speak, but that 'intention' which was either expressly declared by the
parties, competent to make it the governing rule, or which flows, patent
to all from the nature and character of the act, the clear purpose to be
served, the manifest relation which the articles bear to the realty, and the
visible consequences of their severance upon the proper and obvious use
of it." 1 Consideration of each of the factors here suggested will serve to
clarify the conception of "fixtures" as actually applied between landlord
and tenant.
Voorhis v. Freenmn, ° a leading case on fixtures in Pennsylvania, is
credited with having "exploded" the old common-law test of physical
attachment as the criterion of "annexation", 1 substituting for it the test
of adaptation to the stipulated use of the premises.12 But there is no basis
in that case, not even a dictum, warranting any suggestion that it repudiated attachment as an essential of a fixture as between landlord and
tenant, for the Chief Justice expressly noted, "I speak not here of questions between tenant and landlord . . ." 13 Yet unquestionably in Pennsylvania even tenants' fixtures may, under certain circumstances, constitute
an inseparable part of the freehold although not physically attached
thereto.14 And to charge that physical attachment constituted the criterion
of a tenant's privilege to remove fixtures has been held error.' 5 This result
was accomplished by reference in the opinions to the Voorhis case, supplemented by others which deduced from it more than it actually decided.
Particularly influential in this respect was Hill v. Sewald,16 a leading case
for the proposition that "the true legal criterion" is "unquestionably the
intention to annex". 17 It was this case, and not Voorhis v. Freeman,which
effectuated the complete repudiation of attachment as the sole determinant
of removability, extending it by dictum to include even the relation of
landlord and tenant. This dictum has been followed by subsequent deci9. Bank v. North, 16o Pa. 303, 308, 28 Atl. 694, 696 (1894).

2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841).
ii. See Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. 271, 274 (1866). BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
(1936) 638, treats the decision in the Voorhis case as merely an extension of the doctrine of constructive attachment, relying undoubtedly on the court's own words, Voorhis
v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116, 119 (Pa. 1841). Cf. Cantwell, supra note 1,at 135.
12. The oft-quoted words of the court were: "Whether fast or loose . . . all the
machinery of a manufactory which is necessary to constitute it, and without which it
would not be a manufactory at all, must pass for part of the freehold." Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116, 119 (Pa. 184). For interpretation and criticism of this test, see
BRONSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 19.
13. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. ix6, at 119.
14. Compare Union Bldg. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Pennell, 78 F. (2d) 959, 966 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1935), with Hey v. Bruner, 61 Pa. 87, 90 (I869). The dictum in the former
case, that even in the absence of the covenant the fixtures might not be removed, is
based on the consideration that it was indispensable to the effective use of the building.
See Jankey v. Ellis Silk Hosiery Co., 6 F. Supp. 927, 929 (E. D. Pa. 1936). But see
Ege v. Kille, 84 Pa. 333, 341 (1877).
i5.Seeger v. Pettit, 77 Pa. 437 (1875).
16. 53 Pa. 271 (1866).
17. Id. at 273.
1O.

998

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

sions.1 8 The element of attachment was not thereby displaced entirely;
it was merely relegated to a subsidiary position, constituting but one factor
in the determination of the "controlling intention". 19 Since the Hill case,
the courts have preached "intention"--a "mixed question of fact and
law".20 Just what this "intention" really is proves an interesting commentary on the difference between what the cases say and what they
actually mean.
The dogma is that the undisclosed purpose or "secret intention" to
treat the article as real or personal property does not govern its legal
status. 2 This is generally recognized to be the most logical view, since
the problem here involved is essentially one of accession, the real issue
being the loss of a chattel by virtue of its association with the realty, and
therefore the consideration of the actor's intention should not control where
the other attendant circumstances are such that the chattel would be considered to have become a part of the land.2" It is just as well settled that
a specific agreement or expression of mutual intention between landlord
and tenant constitutes the "law between the parties", and no need exists
for resort to the general law of fixtures.2 3 Therefore the test which the
courts really apply is, what "intention" will the law infer from the circumstances surrounding the association of the chattel with the land?
Essentially, the factors considered by the courts in their determination of the tenant's "intention" are: the character of the article, the nature
of its attachment, its adaptation to the stipulated use of the premises, and
the effect of its removal. No one can be taken as a final test of universal
application, for each one has been on some occasion disregarded.
The first factor-the character of the article (meaning its size, weight
and apparent permanence)-plays but a minor part. Inconsistency in the
treatment of various articles is evident, undoubtedly because of the controlling effect of the other elements and the additional fact that intention
is a "mixed question of law and fact". Such articles as gas, electric and
heating appliances, which are ordinarily not of great bulk, are quite consistently held to be removable.2" The size and apparent permanence of
buildings have been held to warrant imputation of the "intent to annex".25
But there are cases contra, holding that even a building may be removed
i8. Watts v. Lehman, io7 Pa. io6 (1884); Wick v. Bredin, i89 Pa. 83, 42 Atl. 17
(1899) ; Donelly v. Frick & Lindsay Co., 207 Pa. 597, 57 Atl. 6o (904); Prudential
Insurance Co. of America v. Kaplan, 330 Pa. 33, i98 Atl. 68 (1938).
ig. See supra note I8.
20. Seeger v. Pettit, 77 Pa. 437 (875)
; Silliman v. Whitmer, ii Pa. Super. 243
(i899), aff'd, 196 Pa. 363, 46 Atl. 489 (Igoo) ; Straight v. Mahoney, i6 Pa. Super. i55
(goI).
21. Bank v. North, i6o Pa. 303, 28 Atl. 694 (894).
See Silliman v. Whitmer,
Straight v. Mahoney, both supra note 20; BRoNsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, at III.
22. This is generally recognized to be the most logical view. See 2 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note 2, §238; Niles, stpra note I, at 85.
23. Reber v. Conway, 203 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913); Union Bldg Co. of Pennsylvania v. Pennell, 78 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) ; Isman v. Hanscom, 217 Pa.
133, 66 Atl. 329 (907) ; McClintock & Irvine Co. v. Aetna Explosive Co., 26o Pa. I9g,
103 Atl. 622 (i918) ; BRoxsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, §28.

24. In re West, 253 Fed. 963 (E. D. Pa. 1918) ; McKim v. Burke, 57 Pa. Super. 530

(1914) (theater chairs and curtain) ; see Jarechi v. Philharmonic Soc., 79 Pa. 403, 405
(1875) ; Bank v. North, 16o Pa. 303, 309, 28 Atl. 694, 697 (1894) (steam radiators).
25. Kenney's Appeal, 22 W. N. C. 89 (Pa. 1888); Carver v. Gough, 153 Pa. 327,
25 Atl. 1124 (1893).
See Lemar v. Miles, 4 Watts 330, 333 (1835), where it was stated

that in the absence of an agreement the removal of dwelling houses, stables, etc., "might
have been considered questionable".
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regardless of its size or the materials of which it was made. 28 Machines
are not by their nature irremovable,
and where the privilege is denied it is
27
on the basis of other factors.

The second element, attachment, as has already been indicated is no
longer the sole factor in the determination of the removability of fixtures,
nor is it even the prime factor-its materiality consisting, apparently, only
in its bearing on the possible damage caused by removal. Rarely is controlling effect given, either verbally or actually, to the fact or mode of
attachment in the face of other considerations showing a contrary "intention". The Voorhis case effectually and correctly assailed the "absurdity
and injustice" of its application, especially in the face of the doctrine of
"constructive attachment", and the difficulty of determining that kind and
degree of fixation requisite to constitute "actual attachment". 28 Thus,
although firmly held in place either by their own gravity or by other means,
such articles as engines, boilers, buildings, casings in oil wells, bowling
alleys, etc., have all been held removable; 29 while machinery and other
apparatus indispensable to the functioning of a particular plant have been
held irremovable though not attached. 30
The third, and one of the most important factors in Pennsylvania, is
the purpose of the article's presence and its adaptation to the stipulated use
of the premises. Under the common law, tenants were declared to be
privileged to remove fixtures when erected for trade, agricultural or
domestic purposes (subject, of course, to certain limitations which will
be discussed presently). The extent to which such privileges exist at
present, and their effect on the requisite "intention" are important questions for our consideration.
Removal of fixtures erected by a tenant in furtherance of the purposes
of his trade, 31 was as an exception "founded on public policy, and intended
.,
)2
to encourage manufactures and the improvements of the country..
In keeping with this declaration of policy, the Hill case, when it established
26. In re Montello Brick Works, 163 Fed. 624, 632 (E. D. Pa. i9o8), petition for

review denied, 167 Fed. 482 (C. C. A. 3d, i9og) ; In re Shelar, 21 F. (2d) 136 (W. D.
Pa. 1927). See White v. Arndt, i Whart. 91, 94 (Pa. 1836) ; Church v. Griffith, 9 Pa.
117, 119 (1848); White's Appeal, to Pa. 253, 254 (1849).

27. Machinery held removable: Lemar v. Miles, 4 Watts 330 (Pa. 1835); Heffner
v. Lewis, 73 Pa. 3o2 (1873) ; Donnelly v. Frick & Lindsay Co., 207 Pa. 597, 57 Atl. 6o
(1904); Jankey v. Ellis Silk Hosiery Co., 16 F. Supp. 927 (E. D. Pa. 1936). Held
irremovable: Reber v. Conway, 2o3 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913) (specific agreement) ;
Union Bldg. Co. of Pa. v. Pennell, 78 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) (specific agreement; especially adapted to building) ; In re American Pile Fabric Co., 85 F. (2d) 961
(C. C. A. 3d, 1936) (especially adapted to building).
28. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116, I18 (Pa. 1841). See AMos AND FERAR,
op. cit. supra note I, at 2o et seq.; BRowx, op. cit. supra note iI, at 638; BRONSON, op.
cit. supra note 2, c. 3, § i8c; EwELL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 45 et seq.; 2 TIFFANY, op.
cit. supranote 2, at 1563.
29. Montello Brick Co. v. Trexler, 167 Fed. 482 (C. C. A. 3d, i9og) (building);
Hey v. Bruner, 6i Pa. 87 (1869) (engine, boiler) ; Robinson v. Harrison, 237 Pa. 613,
85 At. 879 (1912) (casings in oil wells) ; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Kaplan,
330 Pa. 33, 198 Atl. 68 (1938) (bowling alley).
3o. Union Bldg. Co. of Pa. v. Pennell, 78 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913). See
Christian v. Dripps, 28 Pa. 271, 279, Ege v. Kille, 84 Pa. 333, 340 (1877).
3. As to what constitutes a "trade", and what are "trade fixtures" see BRONSON,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 184 et seq. The mere fact that articles may be used in the trade

or profession does not mean that they are "trade fixtures". See Sampson v. Graham,

96 Pa. 405, 408 (i88o) ; Straight v. Mahoney, 16 Pa. Super. 155, 158 ('gol).
32. White v. Arndt, i Whart. 91, 94 (Pa. 1836), cited supra note 6; see Montello
Brick Co. v. Trexler, 167 Fed. 482, 483 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o9). But see Oves v. Oglesby,
7 Watts lo6 (Pa. 1838), "The privilege for the benefit of trade holds only betwixt landlord and tenant, not betwixt third persons and the owner of the soil."
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the doctrine of "intention" as the criterion of annexation, said by way of
dictum, that the "want of intention to convert [chattels into realty] is
imputed to a tenant who attaches to the land fixtures for the use of his
business, the law presuming in favor of trade that he meant to remove them
before the end of his term; and it is only on leaving without removal, the
intention to make a gift of them to the landlord is imputed to him. .

.

."

8

This curt statement, cited as authoritative by the cases,3 4 is in itself an
unqualified admission that, where the controversy is between landlord and
tenant, although intention is theoretically of manifold character, actually
it is but the equivalent of "purpose of the article's presence". Does it
therefore mean that all fixtures introduced for trade purposes are removable? It is settled beyond question that such is not the law, and in
fact the majority of Pennsylvania cases on fixtures as between landlord
and tenant concern that very topic. The contest in these cases is a contest
between conflicting "presumptions"-on the one hand, that of the Hill case,
that the tenant who introduces trade fixtures intends to remove them; and,
on the other, that of the Voorhis case, that one who introduces fixtures
particularly adapted to and indispensable to the use of the premises makes
them an inseparable part thereof. The essence of the latter presumption
is the damage that will result to the plant, in its use, if not in its structure;
and to the extent that it prevails and rebuts the former presumption, it
reveals the significant role of "damage" in the determination of removability
of fixtures.3 5
A separate classification has usually been made of articles used for
agricultural purposes. The leading case of Elwes v. Maw3 in England
held such fixtures irremovable, and its effect in that country was only
eliminated by statute. In Pennsylvania early dicta questioned the rationale
of such a holding and indicated a willingness to accord to agricultural
fixtures the same treatment displayed toward trade fixtures. 37 In one
case 38 the court recognized, but did not decide, the question whether agricultural tenants came within the exception of "trade fixtures", since the
intention not to remove had already been found. A comparatively recent
case 39 mentions the class of agricultural fixtures as one of the exceptions
to the "general rule", and held a silo removable without precisely declaring, however, that the silo was an "agricultural fixture" and therefore
removable as such. There seems to be no room for doubt that the courts
in Pennsylvania will allow removal of agricultural fixtures under the same
circumstances and for the same reasons as "trade flxtures"-a result that
is both desirable and logical.
Where articles have been introduced for purposes of the tenant's own
convenience-the so-called "domestic fixtures"-it is generally conceded
that they may be removed by him. The common-law exception in favor
33. Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. 271, 274 (1866) (italics supplied).
34. See supra notes 18 and 20.
35. See Cantwell, mupra note I, at 136; Niles, supra note i, at 85.
36. 3 East 38 (K. B. 18o2).
37. See White v. Arndt, I Whart. 91, 94 (Pa. 1836) : "I cannot believe that the
nature of the business, whether agricultural or mercantile, can make any difference."
See also Carver v. Gough, 153 Pa. 225, 229, 25 Atl. 1124, 1125 (1893).
38. Carver v. Gough, 153 Pa. 225, 25 Atl. 1124 (1893). The court pointed out that
McCullough v. Irvine, 13 Pa. 438 (185o) which had recognized the English rule that
agricultural buildings were not within the trade exception, was not controlling in the
case before them, a case between landlord and tenant, on the ground that the McCullough case was between life tenant and remainderman.
39. In re Shelar, 21 F. (2d) 136 (W. D. Pa. 1927).
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of the removal of such articles developed later than that for trade fixtures, 40
and the Pennsylvania cases-at least by dicta-have given effect to this
exception. One early case 41 did so by declaring that gas appliances were
not "fixtures", but ordinary chattels, hence could be removed without consideration of any exception to the general rule of "fixtures". The apparent
explanation for this lies in the court's conception of the term "fixture" as
denoting only those articles which are irremovable. This case has been
followed 42 and a similar result achieved in terms of inferred intention not
to make a permanent accession to the freehold. 43 It is to be noted, however, that the privilege to remove is not extended to all articles contributing
to this convenience, for although gas and electric appliances and steam
radiators might be removed, the pipes to which they are connected, and
44
which run through the walls and floors have been declared irremovable.
The controlling consideration is, apparently, the damage which such removal might cause.
The fourth component of "intention"-the effect of the article's removal-is a factor of great practical importance, especially in view of the
fact that it concerns more than mere physical damage to the articles or to
the premises, including as well the consequences upon the "proper and
obvious use" of the realty.45 The latter element far outweighs the former
which is not, however, without significance. The consideration of physical
damage is, for example, a prime factor in the classification of chattels so
popular among writers on fixtures and often used by the courts. It recognizes that the question of removal is really difficult of solution only where
"material injury" to the article or to the premises can be avoided, for where
it is inevitable, the tendency is to consider the improvement a permanent
addition to the realty. 48 However, the courts will, according to the stated
policy of the law favoring additions for particular purposes, relax the
stringency of this consideration to achieve what is in their opinion a desirable result. There is greater likelihood that physical damage will be
tolerated where occasioned by the exigencies of commerce, than where
occasioned by the mere whim of a particular tenant for his own personal
convenience, hence the greater tendency of the courts to allow removal of
trade fixtures despite resultant damage, where the removal of domestic
fixtures under similar circumstances would more hesitatingly be permitted.4 7 But even where installed for trade purposes, if the fixtures are
considered particularly adapted to a certain building, as for example, where
the building was especially constructed to house them, and their removal
would result in precluding the most advantageous use of the premises, such
40. See Amos & FERARD, op. cit. sopr note 2, pt. I, c. 2, § 4;
supra note 2, at II ; EWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, c. 4, § 3.

41.

Vaughan v. Haldeman, 33 Pa. 522

BRONSON, op.

cit.

(1859).

42. Jarechi v. Philharmonic Soc., 79 Pa. 403 (1875).
43. Bank v. North, 16o Pa. 303, 28 Atl. 694 (1894). See BRONSON, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 34; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 24o b.
44. See Vaughan v. Haldeman, 33 Pa. 522, 524 (1859); Jarechi v. Philharmonic
Soc., Bank v. North, both supra note 24.
45. Bank v. North, 16o Pa. 303, 308, 28 Atl. 694, 696 (1894) : or "its relation to
the concern as a going business". It re American Pile Fabric Co., 85 F. (2d) 961, 963
(C. C. A. 3d, 1936).
46. See Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 437, 167 Atl. 321, 322 (1933). See also
BRowN, op. cit. supra note ii, at 631; Bingham, supra note i, at 1o et seq.; Cantwell,
supra note i, at 134.

47. Compare Bank v. North, 16o Pa. 303, 28 Atl. 694 (1894) with Hey v. Bruner,
61 Pa. 87 (1869). Note particularly Seeger v. Pettit, 77 Pa. 437, 441 (1895) : "For
any injury to the freehold by reason of such removal, he is, of course, liable to the
landlord in damages."
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removal is quite consistently denied; 48 whereas, if there is no particular
adaptation to that building, and the use thereof would not be impaired by
removal, it is just as consistently granted.49 Clearly, therefore, the role of
"damage" is an important one-its significance varying according to its
nature and the purpose of the fixture.
Thus, of the four elements of "intention" only two are of controlling
importance--the purpose of the article and the effect of its removal. It is
in terms of these elements that the desirability of permitting removal is
determined, after which the appropriate "intention" is inferred, and from
this necessarily follows the conclusion that had already been reached.
REmOVABLE FIXTURES AS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY

Those articles which are not so associated with the realty as to raise
any question of their becoming a part thereof-that is, are not "fixtures"obviously retain their chattel character and may be removed at any time.
Those which have been so related to the realty as to be considered "annexed"-that is, "irremovable fixtures"-are definitely characterized as
realty.50 But where the articles in question have been so associated with
the land as to be considered "fixtures", yet are removable, a clear-cut contradiction is evident in the description of their status-with one group of
cases declaring
that they are personal property, and therefore, of course,
removable; 51 another saying they are realty, subject to removal.5 2 This
conflict portrays the proneness of the courts to feel that particular cases
can be decided only by precisely classifying the fixtures as real or personal
property-just a few recognizing that there is no inherent contradiction
in treating them as realty at one time, personalty at another, the important
factor being the resolution of the particular issue then before the court.5
Thus all the cases, regardless of their theory, treat such fixtures as they
would personal property in holding them subject to execution in favor of
the tenant's creditors,5 4 to administration in bankruptcy, to recovery in
replevin or trover by the tenant or those claiming under him,5 5 to the claim
of his personal representative upon his death,56 but not subject to mort48. See Union Bldg. Co. of Pa. v. Pennell, 78 F.

(2d)

959, 966 (C. C. A. 3d,

1935) ; it re American Pile Fabric Co., 85 F. (2d) 961, 963 (1936). But see Ege v.
Kille, 84 Pa. 333, 340 (1877).
49. Jankey v. Ellis Silk Hosiery Co., i6 F. Supp. 927 (E. D. Pa. 1936) ; Sampson
v. Graham, 96 Pa. 405 (1880).

See supra note

27.

50. It re American Pile Fabric Co., 85 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936) ; Kenney's Appeal, 22 W. N. C. 88 (Pa. 1888); Harris v. Kelly, 13 Atl. 523 (Pa. 1888);
Bank v. North, i6o Pa. 303, 28 Atl. 694 (1894) ; Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 167
Atl. 321 (1933).
51. Lemar v. Miles, 4 Watts 330 (Pa. 1835) (may be sold on execution) ; Hill v.
Sewald, 53 Pa. 271 (1866) (subject to an action in trover) ; Hey v. Bruner, 61 Pa.
87 (1869) (may be sold on execution, and be subject of replevin).
52. See Overton v. Williston, 31 Pa. 155, i6o (1858) ; Darrah v. Baird, Ioi Pa.
265, 273 (1882).

53. This third group is composed of cases which merely decide the issue without
saying expressly that the fixtures are real or personal property: It re Shelar, 21 F. (2d)
136 (W. D. Pa. 1927) (removable fixture passes to trustee in bankruptcy) ; Jankey v.
Ellis Silk Hosiery Co., 16 F. Supp. 927 (E. D. Pa. 1936) (not subject to lien of mortgage) ; Hey v. Bruner, 61 Pa. 87 (x869) (subject to execution) ; Robinson v. Harrison, 237 Pa. 613, 85 AtI. 879 (1912) (casings in oil wells removable by tenant). This
is considered the better approach. See Niles, supra note I, at 87.
54. Compare Lemar v. Miles, 4 Watts 330, 332 (Pa. 1835) with Overton v. Williston, 31 Pa. 155, 16o (I858), and Darrah v. Baird, ioi Pa. 265, 273 (1882), and also
with Hey v. Bruner, 61 Pa. 87, 9o (1869).
55. Compare Darrah v. Baird, ioi Pa. 265 (1882) with Watts v. Lehman, 107 Pa.
io6 (1884).
56. See Lemar v. Miles, 4 Watts 331, 332 (Pa. 1835).
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gagee's or mechanic's liens.5 7 They are not like personal property, however, in that termination of the tenancy determines likewise the tenant's
interest in the fixtures which thereupon become inseparable from the
realty,5 81 and an assignment of the party's interest in the land carries with
it his interest in the fixtures. 9
RIGHTS BETWEEN LANDLORD AND TENANT AS AFFECTED BY AGREEMENT

The existence of a specific agreement between landlord and tenant
concerning the status of fixtures obviates consideration of the "general
law" of fixtures with its exceptions and presumptions; and the rights of
the parties are determined in accordance with the express provisions, regardless of what they would otherwise have been. 60 The problem in such
cases is therefore one of construction of language-usually in the form of
covenants in the lease-and the tendency is to resolve all doubts against
the landlord in favor of the tenant."' In the absence of ambiguity, however, the instrument is to be strictly construed by the courts,
and it has
62
been held error to submit it to the jury for interpretation.
No general rule can be stated as to the interpretation of particular
provisions, for each case rests on its own facts. Thus in Union Building
Company of Pennsylvania v. Pennell 63 a provision that all "alterations,
additions and improvements" should remain at the expiration of the lease
was construed as including practically every change that could be made in
the premises, and every chattel that could be installed therein. 64 This
broad interpretation was adopted on the authority of a statement to that
effect in Isnman v. Hanscom 65 where the same words were involved. The
latter case was also followed in Reber v. Conway 66 where the court refused
to give any weight to the distinction pointed out in Lindsay Brothers, Inc.
57. See Church v. Griffith, 9 Pa. 117, iig (1848) ; White's Appeal, io Pa. 252, 253
(1849). Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 167 Atl. 321 (1933) upheld a mechanic's
lien, but the court clearly pointed out that the fixture had become a permanent part of
the realty, hence was not even removable by the tenant. A trustee in bankruptcy prevails over a mortgagee of realty: In re Shelar, 21 F. (2d) 136 (W. D. Pa. 1927).
58. Davis v. Moss, 38 Pa. 346 (1861) ; Darrah v. Baird, ioI Pa. 265 (1882) ; Stopper v. Kantner, 29 Pa. Super. 48 (1905); Black v. Hoffman, 324 Pa. 193, 188 Atl. 149
(1936) ; see Overton v. Williston, 31 Pa. 155 (1858).

59. Claimants in the right of the tenant, as assignees, vendees, etc., have the same

privilege, but are subject to the same limitations as the tenant Hey v. Bruner, 61 Pa.
87 (1869) ; Black v. Hoffman, 324 Pa. 193, 188 Atl. 149 (1936) ; cf. Thropp's Appeal,

7o Pa. 395 (1872). A covenant against assignments does not preclude sheriff's vendee
from removing fixtures: Seitzinger v. Marsden, 2 Penny. 463 (Pa. 1882). Devisee of
landlord is entitled to latter's rights: Kenney's Appeal, 22 W. N. C. 89 (Pa. 1888). Interest of mortgagee under a mortgage prior or subsequent to erection of fixture is determined on basis of tenant's "intention to annex": Jankey v. Ellis Silk Hosiery Co.,
16 F. Supp. 927 (E. D. Pa. 1936) (mortgage prior to erection and lease as well) ; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Kaplan, 330 Pa. 33, 198 Atl. 68 (938)

(subsequent to

erection; prior to lease in question). But see Kinnear v. Scenic Ry. Co. of America,
223 Pa. 390, 400,
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Atl. SoS, 811 (19o9).

6o. See supra note

23.

61. Lemar v. Miles, 4 Watts 330 (Pa. 1835) ; Montello Brick Co. v. Trexler, 167
Fed. 482 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o9) ; Lindsay Bros., Inc. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 236 Pa. 229, 84
Atl. 783 (1912) ; McClintock & Irvine Co. v. Aetna Explosive Co., 26o Pa. 192, 1O3
Atl. 622 (i9i8). But in Shellar v. Shivers, 171 Pa. $69, 33 Atd. 95 (895) a provision
permitting removal of fixtures at "any time" was construed in favor of the landlqrd to

mean only a "reasonable time".

62. Harris v. Kelly, 13 Atl. 523 (Pa. 1888).

63. 78 F. (2d) 959 (C. C.A. 3d, 1935).
64. Id. at 965.

65. 217 Pa. 133, 137, 66 At. 329, 330 (1907).
66. 203 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913).
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v. Curtis Publishing Company,61 that the covenant in the Isman case had
further provided "except movable furniture", hence obviously the court
had to decide that the above provision rendered irremovable all improvements even if not made merely to the structure of the building, unless in
the class of "movable furniture". The Lindsay case restricted these words
to include only changes in the structure of the building. A similar provision was held not to preclude removal of an entire new building erected
by the tenant.6 The fact that the landlord is given an option to purchase
the fixtures, or to require that they remain at the end of the term does not
preclude their removal before exercise of the option.69 But where introduction of the fixture by the tenant is expressly provided for under circumstances warranting the inference that it was 0part of the consideration for
the leasehold interest, he may not remove it.7

Here, as elsewhere, is evident the propensity of the courts to consider
the issue of removability as dependent upon the character of a fixture as
real or personal property, when they attribute to an agreement which
grants or denies the privilege to remove, the effect of preserving the chattel
as "personalty" or converting it into "realty". 71 Yet the same conclusions
may be reached, as under the general law of fixtures, without precisely
and categorically classifying the article as one or the other.
CONCLUSION

Through a maze of conflicting terminology appear the principles
already set forth, and they reveal that in the absence of a specific agreement the "intention" which controls removability of fixtures is little more
than a convenient label affixed to a conclusion reached upon considerations
of policy and presumption. That justifiable concern for the interests of
the tenant which induces the court to presume an "intention" not to make
a permanent accession to the premises yields only to anxiety over the
possible subjection of the landlord to substantial loss, in which case a contrary presumption governs. Resort to presumption belies the declaration
of the significance of any "intention" (unless it is clearly understood, as it
apparently is in Pennsylvania, that not subjective, but inferred intention
is meant), and the courts would do well to avoid such specious analysis
and to state their conclusions in the same terms in which they conceive
them. Greater consistency is evident in what the courts have done than
in the reasons for their having done it. The results outlined above do not
square with any precise definition of fixtures as purely realty or personalty,
yet they obtain in this jurisdiction-with conflicting theories behind them.
Hence there is point to the apt diagnosis made by the federal judge who
remarked that "The law of fixtures as pronounced by the courts 72in Pennsylvania seems to be settled. The trouble is with its application".
M.E.P.
67. 236 Pa. 229, 233, 64 Atl. 783, 784 (1912).
68. It re Montello Brick Works, 163 Fed. 624 (E. D. Pa. I9o8), petition for review
denied, 167 Fed. 482 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o9).
69. Lemar v. Miles, 4 Watts 330 (Pa. 1835) ; Seitzinger v. Marsden, 2 Penny. 463
(Pa. 1882). Exercise of an option (to require that fixtures remain) within four weeks
of the expiration of the lease was held to be within a reasonable time: Isman v.HIanscon, 217 Pa. 133, 66 Atl. 329 (1907).

70. Hey v. Bruner, 61 Pa. 87 (1869); Jermyn v. Dickson, 3 Luz. Leg. Reg. IOO
(Pa. 1874).
71. See Wick v. Bredin, 189 Pa. 83, 93, 42 Atl. 17, i (1899) ; Union Bldg. Co. of
Pa. v. Pennell, 78 F. (2d) 959, 966 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935). But see Clayton v. Lienhard,
312 Pa. 433, 438, 167 Atl. 321, 323 (1933).

72. Woolley Circuit Judge, dissenting in McConnell v. Chelton Trust Co., 282 Fed.

lO5, no (C. C. A. 3d,

1922).

